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WASTE MANAGEMENT HOLDINGS v. GILMORE: THE
ANYTHING BUT DORMANT PROBLEM OF
INTERSTATE WASTE
I.

INTRODUCTION

Disposing of municipal solid waste (MSW) has created a national problem that raises intricate technological and political issues.1 The United States generates the largest amount of solid
waste in the world and the amount increases every year.2 At least
eighty percent of the solid waste is distributed in landfills across the
country.3 Landfill space, however, is rapidly diminishing and the
4
environmental repercussions of landfill use are quickly surfacing.
In fact, experts project that nearly eighty percent of existing solid
waste landfills will close by the year 2009. 5 At that time, there will
not be sufficient waste disposal sites available to meet the increased
demands of MSW. 6 Consequently, many states have resorted to exporting their waste to other states, thus transforming a local prob7
lem into a national problem.
In an attempt to protect themselves, states that receive waste
from other states have enacted statutes to limit or restrict waste importation. 8 Recipient states are often concerned with preserving
their available landfill space as well as protecting their citizens from
1. See Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774, 778 (4th Cir. 1996)
(discussing unconstitutionality of South Carolina law regulating hazardous wastes).
2. See Robert R.M. Verchick, The Commerce Clause, EnvironmentalJustice, and the
Interstate Garbage Wars, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1246 (1997) (discussing rapid
growth of MSW in United States).
3. See id. (discussing problem of garbage disposal in America).
4. See id. (discussing diminishing landfill capacity and environmental
repercussions).
5. See id. As old landfills close, it is becoming more difficult to find adequate
sites. See id. Finding new sites is especially difficult as environmental concerns,
coupled with health hazards, surface with regard to the long-term repercussions of
landfill use. See id.
6. SeeJason Barocas, Note, Houlton Citizens' Coalition v. Town of Houlton: Is
An "Open and Competitive" Bidding Process Really the Solution to National Waste Disposal
Problems?, 11 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 393, 394 (2000) (discussing problem of insufficient
disposal sites and concept of open bidding process as solution to waste problems).
7. See James E. Breitenbucher, Yakety Yak, Take Your Garbage Back: Do States
Have Any Protection From Becoming the Dumping Grounds For Out-Of-State Municipal
Solid Waste?, 32 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 225, 227 (1997) (discussing state's
lack of protection from out-of-state MSW).
8. See Barocas, supra note 6, at 394 (discussing actions taken by waste recipient
states).
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the environmental hazards of landfilling, which threatens the environment in various ways. 9 First, many landfills contain large quantities of toxic and hazardous materials. 10 Second, older landfills leak
contaminants into adjacent land or aquifers. 1 Third, landfills can
generate uncontrolled amounts of methane into the air, which can
cause health and safety hazards. 12 Finally, landfills create a nuisance in neighboring communities due to the smell, increased traffic, and an ever-growing and unwelcome rat population.1 3
As states have tried to deal with the effects of large-scale waste
importation, courts have continuously struck down waste restrictive
statutes as violating the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution. 14 The courts' interpretation of the Dormant
Commerce Clause and their general reluctance to allow states to
limit the importation of waste has led to a significant environmental
problem where waste-export states are not held accountable for the
15
waste they produce.
This Note addresses the recent decision of the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Waste Management Holdings Inc. v. Gilmore,1 6 in
which the court struck down most of a Virginia statute aimed at
restricting the transport and disposal of out-of-state MSW in Virginia.' 7 The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia and
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a majority of the statute's
provisions were unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce

9. See generally Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316 (4th Cir.
2001) (discussing Virginia's attempt to safeguard environment and its citizens
from increased import of MSW).
10. SeeVerchick, supra note 2, at 1246-47 (discussing problems associated with

landfilling).
11. See id. (discussing negative effects of landfilling).

12. See id. Uncontrolled amounts of methane gas can cause safety hazards
and fire hazards as well. See id.
13. See id. (explaining detrimental consequences of landfilling and resident

opposition).
14. See Lincoln L. Davies, If You Give The Court A Commerce Clause: An Environmental Justice Critique of Supreme Court Interstate Waste Jurispridence, 11 FoRDHAm
ENvrL. L.J. 207, 253 (1999) (discussing how recent federal and state court deci-

sions have invalidated state restrictions on transportation and disposal of out-ofstate MSW).
15. See Breitenbucher, supra note 7, at 229-31 (noting practical effect of judi-

cial interpretation of Dormant Commerce Clause).

16. 252 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2001).
17. See id. at 349 (discussing Fourth Circuit's decision invalidating certain
waste restrictive provisions).
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Clause. 18 Part II presents the facts of Waste Management.19 Part III
outlines the background of the Dormant Commerce Clause and
past judicial decisions concerning the doctrine with respect to interstate waste. 20 Part IV provides both a narrative and critical analysis
of the Fourth Circuit's decision. 2 ' Finally, Part V discusses the over22
all impact of this decision.
II.

FAcrs

In March and April of 1999, the state of Virginia enacted five
statutory provisions to curtail the importation of MSW that may be
accepted by landfills located in Virginia.2 3 The first statutory provision, the Cap Provision, caps the amount of waste a Virginia landfill
can accept. 24 The second statutory provision, the Stacking Provision, prohibits stacking containerized waste more than two containers high on a barge. 25 This provision also allows for other
regulations associated with the shipment of waste via barge, ship or
vessel. 26 The third statutory provision, the Three Rivers' Ban, prohibits "the commercial transportation of hazardous or nonhazardous solid waste . . . by ship, barge, or other vessel upon the
18. See id. (contemplating Fourth Circuit's holding); see also Waste Mgmt.
Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 87 F. Supp. 2d 536, 544-45 (E.D. Va. 2000) (setting forth
district court's holding).
19. For a discussion of the facts of Waste Mgmt., see infra notes 23-45 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the background and an overview of the Dormant Commerce Clause, see infra notes 46-144 and accompanying text.
21. For the narrative and critical analysis, see infra notes 145-251 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of impact of Waste Mgmt., see infra notes 252-59 and accompanying text.
23. See Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore,252 F.3d 316, 323 (4th Cir. 2001)
(citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1408.1(q), 10.1-1408.3, 10.1-1454.1(A), 10.1-1454.2,
10.1-1454.3 (Michie Supp. 2000)) (discussing content of Virginia's statute concerning MSW).
24. See id. Under the Cap Provision a Virginia landfill may accept either 2,000
tons of MSW per day or the average amount accepted by the landfill in 1998, depending upon which is greater. See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1408.3. The Cap Provision also allows Virginia's Waste Management Board to grant individual requests
for exceptions contingent upon a set of factors as well as the discretion of the
Board. See id.
25. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 323 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §10.1-1454.1(A)
(2001)) (discussing parameters of Stacking Provision and its intent to prevent escape of waste in event of an accident).
26. See id. This provision calls for the creation of a Board to develop regulations governing the transport of MSW by barge or other vessel. See VA. CODE ANN.
§10.1-1454.1 (2001). Some of the regulations to be considered by the Board include the issuance of permits and the design of watertight and secured transport
containers. See id.
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navigable waters of the Rappahanock, James and York Rivers, to the
fullest extent consistent with limitations posed by the Constitution
of the United States." 27 The fourth statutory provision, the Trucking Provision, prohibits vehicles with four or more axels from transporting MSW "unless the transporter of the waste provides
certification, in a form prescribed by the Board, that the waste is
free of substances not authorized for acceptance at the facility." 28
Finally, the fifth statutory provision, the Four or More Axel Provision, requires that the Board promulgate regulations governing the
"commercial transport" of MSW by "any tractor truck semi trailer
combination with four or more axels." 29
At the time these statutory provisions were enacted, Fresh Kills
landfill in Staten Island, New York, had recently announced that by
December 2001 it would cease accepting waste. 30 The New York
City Department of Sanitation negotiated interim disposal contracts
to phase out dependency on Fresh Kills. 3 1 Landfills in Virginia
were awarded two of these contracts and a third twenty-year contract was in the process of being negotiated. 32 The third contract
contemplated the disposal of 12,000 tons of residential waste per

day that emanated from four of the five New York boroughs.3 3 If
the third contract is awarded to Virginia, sixty percent of New York
34
City's residential MSW would be deposited in Virginia landfills.

27. Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 323 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1454.2 (2001))

(discussing Three Rivers' Ban Provision).
28. Id. at 323-24 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1408.1 (Q) (2001)) (discussing
Trucking Provision and its attempt to limit mass importation of waste through
large trucks). For statutory support for the creation of the monitoring board, see
supra note 26.
29. Id. at 325 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1454.3(A),(D)). "Among other
things, the Four or More Axel Provision provides that the new regulations require,
as a condition of carrying MSW on Virginia roads, the owners of such trucks to
make financial assurances that trucks having less than four axels or carrying other
cargo need not make." Id.
30. See id. at 325-26 (noting relevant background to enactment of Virginia's
statute).
31. See id. New York faced the challenge of exporting waste that had been
disposed of in Fresh Kills landfill for nearly fifty years. See id.
32. See Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 87 F. Supp. 2d 536, 539 (E.D. Va.
2000) (discussing New York City's interim disposal contracts).
33. See id. The four boroughs include Manhattan, Queens, Brooklyn, and the
Bronx. See id. "In addition to the residential waste covered by existing and pending contracts, Waste Management also removes significant quantities of commercial waste per day from New York City and surrounding communities." Id.
(emphasis omitted).
34. See id. One Virginia landfill, the Charles City Landfill, would be particularly affected. See id. Furthermore, these contracts also require that the waste be
containerized and transported by barge. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 326.
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After Virginia enacted the five statutory provisions, several
landfill operators and transporters of MSW and one Virginia
County (Plaintiffs) commenced this action in the Eastern District of
Virginia.3 5 Plaintiffs brought this suit enjoining multiple individuals, including Virginia's Governor, James Gilmore, Virginia's Secretary of Natural Resources, John Paul Woodley, Virginia's Director of
the Department of Environmental Control, Dennis Treacy (Defendants).36 Plaintiffs challenged the Virginia statute arguing that the
provisions violated the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Contract
Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. 37 Virginia asserted that these statutory provisions were
adopted as a legitimate exercise of its police powers to protect the
38
public health and to conserve Virginia's resources.
Plaintiffs moved for Summary Judgment and on February 2,
2000, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted
Plaintiffs' motion, determining that Virginia's statutory provisions
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution. 39 The
district court also held that the Three Rivers' Ban and the Stacking
40
Provision violated the Supremacy Clause under the Constitution.
The Defendants appealed to the Fourth Circuit, challenging the
41
propriety of the district court's decision.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in Plaintiffs' favor with re35. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 324 n.2. Plaintiffs consist of: (1) Waste Management Holdings, Inc. which operates large landfills in Virginia; (2) Weanack
Land Limited Partners which owns and operates a transfer facility on the James
River; (3) Hale Intermodal Marine Company, a barging company; (4) Charles City
County, which leases property to lease management for landfill use; and (5) Brunswick Waste Management Facility, L.L.C., which owns and operates a large landfill.
See id. at 324.
36. See id.
37. See Waste Mgmt., 87 F. Supp. 2d at 537 (discussing Plaintiffs' argument that
all five statutory provisions are unconstitutional).
38. See id. at 538 (explaining Virginia's reasons for enacting statutory
provisions).
39. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 324 (discussing district court's decision granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment). The district court held that the
statutes discriminated facially against out-of-state interests thus justifying strict scrutiny review. See Waste Mgmt., 87 F. Supp. 2d at 542. Furthermore, Virginia had not
demonstrated that no adequate, non-discriminatory alternatives exist. See id.
40. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 324. The Supremacy Clause provides that the
"Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, and Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
41. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 324 (discussing Defendants' appeal to Fourth
Circuit).
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spect to their Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to the Cap
Provision, the Trucking Provision, and the Four or More Axel Provision. 42 The Fourth Circuit also affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Plaintiffs concerning the Supremacy Clause
challenge to the Three Rivers' Ban. 43 The Fourth Circuit, however,

vacated and remanded the district court's grant of Summary Judgment with respect to the Dormant Commerce Clause challenge to
the Three Rivers' Ban and the Stacking Provision. 44 The Fourth
Circuit also vacated and remanded the district court's grant of Summary Judgment with respect to the Supremacy Clause challenge to
45
the Stacking Provision.
III.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Commerce Clause

The United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause is rich with internal contradictions. 46 The Commerce
Clause states that "Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.

'47

While the Commerce

Clause is an affirmative grant to Congress, between the carefully
crafted words, the Supreme Court has long recognized a corollary
doctrine referred to as the negative or dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause. 4 8 The Dormant Commerce Clause is ajudicially created limit on a state's ability to regulate interstate commerce absent
congressional action. 4 9 The justification behind this doctrine is
42. See id. at 349 (reporting Fourth Circuit's concurrence with district court's

holding that provisions violate Dormant Commerce Clause).
43. See id. (stating Fourth Circuit's decision to affirm district court's judgment
with regards to Supremacy Clause challenge to Three Rivers' Ban).
44. See id. (revealing Fourth Circuit's decision to vacate and remand because
genuine issue of material fact existed regarding health and environmental hazards
associated with stacking sealed shipping containers more than two high on
barges).
45. See id. (discussing decision to vacate and remand district court's grant of
Summary Judgment with respect to Supremacy Clause challenge of Stacking
Provision).
46. See Richard A. Epstein, Waste & The Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 GREEN BAG
2D 29, 29 (1999). "The most evident of these [contradictions] is the stark contrast
between the intellectual precommitments to the affirmative use of the commerce
power on the one hand and dormant, or negative, use of the commerce power on
the other." Id.
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
48. See Davies, supra note 14, at 230-31 (discussing concept of environmental
justice in connection with Supreme Court interstate waste jurisprudence).
49. See Benjamin T. Kurten, National Solid Wastes Management Association v.
Meyer: Another Strike Against a State's Ability To Save its Landfill 3 Wis. ENV-rL. L.J.
245, 250 (1996). The Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from promoting
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that the nation is one common market "in which state lines cannot
be made barriers to the free flow of both raw material and finished
50
goods in response to the economic laws of supply and demand.
The Dormant Commerce Clause provides for an efficient and free
interstate trade market and serves to protect residents from burden51
some or discriminatory laws for which they cannot vote.
The Dormant Commerce Clause is not without criticism. 52 Major criticisms of the Dormant Commerce Clause include its lack of
textual and historical foundation and the absence of support in the
Constitution for the negative inference.5 3 While The Federalist papers are cited as historical support for the Framers' intent, the origin of the Dormant Commerce Clause is not overwhelmingly
apparent. 54 Another criticism is that the Dormant Commerce
Clause upsets the balance of power created by the Constitution by
granting a power not delegated in the Constitution to the judiciary. 55 An additional but related criticism is that the Dormant Commerce Clause limits the power given to the states by the
Constitution. 56 Despite unyielding criticism, the Dormant Commerce Clause continues to be recognized by courts as a living and

their own internal economic interests by limiting the movement of out-of-state articles. See id.
50. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803 (1976) (discussing
justification behind Dormant Commerce Clause).
51. See Davies, supra note 14, at 231. Although these justifications may be
based on sound policy and some historical reasoning, the Supreme Court still recognizes that the doctrine is entirely theoretical. See id. at 231-32.
52. See id. at 243-61 (illustrating traditional critiques of Dormant Commerce
Clause such as lack of textual and historical foundation).
53. See id. at 245-47 (critiquing Dormant Commerce Clause).
54. See id. Both proponents and opponents of the Dormant Commerce
Clause cite to James Madison's statement in an 1829 letter to a friend. See id. at
246. Madison stated that the Commerce Clause was "intended as a negative and
preventive provision against injustice among the [s]tates themselves, rather than as
a power to be used for the positive purposes of the General Government, in which
alone, however, the remedial power could be lodged." Id. (quoting letter from
James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 14, 15 (1867)). Depending upon whether the interpretation of"general government" means the judiciary or the legislature, the statement
could be used to support either side. See id.
55. See id. at 248-50 (discussing how Dormant Commerce Clause grants power
to judiciary by judiciary and not through Congress)..
56. See Davies, supra note 14, at 249-52 (arguing that "[b]y giving the federal
government a power not explicitly granted to it by the Constitution, the doctrine
fundamentally betrays the compromise of federalism reached by the Framers.").
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viable doctrine with almost limitless bounds. 5 7 Interstate waste dis58
posal is one area in which the doctrine is alive and flourishing.
B.

Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis

The Supreme Court has adopted a two-tiered analysis to examine a statute challenged under the Dormant Commerce
Clause. 59 The first tier applies when a state law is discriminatory
facially, in its practical effect or purpose. 60 This tier is usually referred to as "a virtually per se rule of invalidity."'6 1 If it is determined that a statute is discriminatory either facially, in its practical
effect or in its purpose, it will most likely be struck down. 62 The
Fourth Circuit, in Sylvia Development Corporationv. Maryland,63 enumerated several factors which were deemed probative of whether a
64
decision-making body was motivated by discriminatory intent.
Those factors included: (1) evidence of a consistent pattern of disparate impact; (2) historical background; (3) the specific sequence
of events leading to the decision; and (4) contemporaneous statements of the decision-makers. 65 In order for such a discriminatory
57. See id. at 253 (noting courts continue to use Dormant Commerce Clause
but its application is unpredictable). The inconsistent application of the Dormant
Commerce Clause has resulted in confusion among the courts as they struggle to
form a coherent framework. See id.; see also Epstein, supra note 46, at 31 (discussing
how court utilized Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to limit exercise of state
power).
58. See, e.g., Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2001) (exploring contours of
Dormant Commerce Clause with respect to Virginia statute, limiting importation
of out-of-state waste).
59. See Frank P. Grad, RCRA, the Business of Waste Disposaland the Dormant Commerce Clause Now Wide Awake, SC 56 ALI-ABA 629, 630 (1998) (discussing different
tests applied under Dormant Commerce Clause analysis).
60. See Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774, 785 (4th Cir. 1996); see
also Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454-55 (1992) (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
61. See Verchick, supra note 2, at 1272. This per se rule of invalidity is a strict
scrutiny test. See id. City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey established this strict scrutiny
test. See id. (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 427 U.S. 617 (1978)).
62. See Barocas, supra note 6, at 400-01 (citing C & A Carbone v. Town of
Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994)) (explaining if law is found to be discriminatory on its face, in its purpose, or in its effect then law is per se unconstitutional).
63. 48 F.3d 810 (4th Cir. 1995).
64. See id.
65. See id. at 819.
Several factors have been recognized as probative of whether a decisionmaking body was motivated by a discriminatory intent, including: (1) evidence of a "consistent pattern" of actions by the decision making body
disparately impacting members of a particular class of persons; (2) historical background of the decision, which may take into account any history
of discrimination by the decisionmaking body or the jurisdiction it represents; (3) the specific sequence of events leading up to the decision being
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law or statute to survive, the state has the burden of demonstrating
that the discriminatory law is justifiable by a valid factor unrelated
to economic protectionism and that there are no other nondiscrim66
inatory alternatives to preserve the local interests at stake.
The second tier of the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis applies if the state law regulates evenhandedly, having only incidental
effects on interstate commerce. 67 If the state law has an indirect or
incidental effect on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, the court usually applies a balancing test to determine the
constitutionality of the state law. 68 This balancing test is derived
from Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.69 The burden imposed on interstate
commerce is weighed against the putative local benefits. 70 If there
is a legitimate local interest, the test is one of degree. 7 1 It should be
noted, however, that the distinction between the per se rule of inva72
lidity and the Pike balancing test is not always clear.
C. Judicial Application of Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis
Concerning Waste Restrictive Statutes
In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 73 the Supreme Court first
addressed a state's limitation on interstate shipment and importation of waste under the Dormant Commerce Clause. 7 4 This case
typifies the Supreme Court's position on interstate waste in both
challenged, including any significant departures from normal procedures; and (4) contemporary statements by decisionmakers on the record
or in minutes of their meetings.
Id.
66. See New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274-75 (1998)
(finding Ohio statute unconstitutional because it discriminated against interstate
commerce); see also Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342-45
(1992) (holding state did not meet its burden in proving other nondiscriminatory
alternatives existed to alleviate its waste importation concern).
67. See Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)) (discussing second tier of
Dormant Commerce Clause test).
68. See id. (commenting upon applicability of Pike balancing test).
69. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 137 (1970) (revealing balancing
test used to weigh burden on interstate commerce against putative local benefits).
70. See id. at 142.
71. See Kurten, supra note 49, at 252 (characterizing Pike balancing test as test
of degree).
72. See Envtl. Tech. Counci 98 F.3d at 785 (explaining uncertainty which exists
between when to apply per se rule and when to apply Pike balancing test).
73. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
74. See id. (holding statute that prohibited import of MSW violated Commerce Clause); see also Breintenbucher, supra note 7, at 234 (discussing City of
Philadelphia).
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result and analysis. 75 In City of Philadelphia,New Jersey enacted a
statute prohibiting the importation of most "solid or liquid waste
which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of
the State." 76 The Supreme Court began its analysis by determining
that waste is an object of commerce. 77 The Court concluded that
that the New Jersey law was discriminatory "on its face and in its
78
plain effect" and was therefore invalid.
The Supreme Court distinguished the New Jersey law from
other "quarantine" cases where exceptions to the Commerce
Clause had been made. 79 According to the majority, trash did not
fit the quarantine exception because trash does not have to be disposed of immediately, while objects in other "quarantine" cases, as
a result of their very movement, must be quickly discarded. s0 Because the Court determined that the NewJersey law was outside the
scope of a quarantine law, the Supreme Court held that the New
Jersey law violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. 8 1 The Supreme
Court's main contention was that the law "falls squarely within the
area that the Commerce Clause puts off limits to state regulation
... [w] hat is crucial is the attempt by one State to isolate itself from
a problem common to many by erecting a barrier against the move'8 2
ment of interstate trade.
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented in
City of Philadelphia,noting that solid waste has enormous negative
83
environmental effects that states must be empowered to regulate.
The dissent argued that "New Jersey should be free under our past

75. See Davies, supranote 14, at 232 (explaining importance of City of Philadelphia to judicial landscape of interstate waste).
76. City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 618 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:111 et
seq. (1973)) (discussing parameters of New Jersey statute).
77. See Davies, supra note 14, at 233 (discussing Supreme Court's analysis in
City of Philadelphia).
78. City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 626-27 (explaining New Jersey's law was
discriminatory and therefore invalid).
79. See id. at 628-29 (discussing quarantine exception to Commerce Clause
and how it does not apply to New Jersey's law).
80. See Davies, supra note 14, at 234 (discussing Supreme Court's analysis of
why New Jersey's law did not fit quarantine exception to Commerce Clause).
81. See City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 628-29 (explaining NewJersey law falls
outside quarantine exception and therefore violates Dormant Commerce Clause).
82. Id. at 628 (explaining why New Jersey's law violates Dormant Commerce
Clause).
83. See Davies, supra note 14, at 234 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in City of Philadelphia).
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precedents to prohibit the importation of solid waste because of the
84
health and safety problems that such waste poses to its citizens."
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court ignored the environmental concerns raised by the dissent in City of Philadelphiaand expanded its holding that import restrictions of waste violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause. 85 Fourteen years after City of Philadelphia, the Supreme Court struck down another waste restricting statute in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of
NaturalResources.86 In Fort Gratiot, Michigan enacted a Solid Waste
Management Act which stated that counties could not landfill waste
generated outside their borders unless they received prior approval
from their County Solid Waste Planning Committee.8 7 In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court struck down Michigan's statute as discriminatory, because the statute authorized each county to refuse
waste from the national economy and gave local waste producers
protection from out-of-state competition seeking to use local disposal areas.8 8 Striking down the Michigan law, the Court suggested
that Michigan could "for example, limit the amount of waste that
landfill operators may accept each year" as a method of avoiding
discriminating between in-state and out-of-state waste. 8 9 This measure, however, was not in the Michigan statute and was not an
issue .90

Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Blackmun, dissented
in Fort Gratiot,arguing that the Michigan statute advanced local en84. City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 632 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent
argued, "The physical fact of life that NewJersey must somehow dispose of its own
noxious items does not mean that it must serve as a depository for those of every
other state .... The Court's effort to distinguish these prior [quarantine] cases is
unconvincing." Id.
85. See, e.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural
Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992). This case demonstrates the Supreme Court's reluctance
to address environmental concerns implicated by the interstate transport of waste.
See id. at 354.
86. 504 U.S 353 (1992).
87. See id. at 357. The statute reads: "[a] person shall not accept for disposal
solid waste ... that is not generated in the county in which the disposal area is
located unless the acceptance of solid waste... that is not generated in the county
is explicitly authorized in the approved county solid waste management plan." Id.
88. See id. at 355 (holding Michigan statute discriminates against interstate
commerce). The Court concluded that "the Waste Import Restrictions unambiguously discriminate against interstate commerce and are appropriately characterized as protectionist measures that cannot withstand scrutiny under the Commerce
Clause." Id. at 367-68.
89. See id. at 367 (articulating less burdensome alternative to managing waste
flow into Michigan).
90. See id. (discussing possible alternative for limiting flow of MSW into state).
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vironmental concerns and not economic protectionism. 9 1 In fact,
the statute worked to Michigan's economic disadvantage because of

the limited disposal volumes. 9 2 The dissent suggested that the statute should be remanded for further consideration under the Pike

balancing

test.

93

The Supreme Court, again ignoring the environmental con-

cerns highlighted by the dissenting arguments, upheld the stringent application of the Dormant Commerce Clause to waste in
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt.94 The Alabama state legislature imposed an additional disposal fee on hazardous wastes generated outside of the state.9 5 The fee, however, did not apply to
hazardous waste originating from within the state. 96 Petitioner, an
operator of a commercial hazardous waste land disposal facility in
Alabama that received both in-state and out-of-state waste, challenged the statutory provision as violating the Dormant Commerce
Clause. 97 In this case, ninety percent of the hazardous waste landfil98
led within Alabama came from other states.
The Supreme Court followed the reasoning in City of Philadelphia, holding that the additional fee did not serve any local interest
and Alabama could not isolate itself from a problem common to all
states. 9 9 Furthermore, the state's additional fee discouraged the
91. See Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 368-69 (discussing practical effect of Michigan
statute).
92. See id. at 370 (noting Michigan statute works to Michigan's economic disadvantage); see also Davies, supra note 14, at 236 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Fort Gratiot).
93. See Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S at 371. ChiefJustice Rehnquist's interpretation of
the Commerce Clause contemplates the substantial environmental concerns associated with landfilling. See Breintenbucher, supra note 7, at 251. A cost-benefit
analysis lends strong support for this view. See id. While out-of-state waste must be
treated the same as in-state waste, the practical cost is not at all equal. See id.
There are numerous in-state costs and risks which are substantial. See id. There is
the damage to the environment and the community as well as potential risk of
clean-up cost if future problems arise. See id.
94. 504 U.S. 334 (1992) (holding additional fee imposed by Alabama on hazardous waste generated outside of Alabama and disposed of at commercial facility
in Alabama discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of Commerce
Clause).
95. Id. at 336. Surcharges on waste imported from other states can act as a
substitute for an import restriction and it can also serve to compensate a state for
the costs of importing and disposing of the waste. See Davies, supra note 14, at 237.
96. See Davies, supra note 14, at 237 (noting Alabama law does not apply fee to
waste originating from within Alabama).
97. See id. at 237-38 (discussing Petitioners' argument).
98. See id. at 237 (discussing origin of waste being disposed of in Alabama).
99. See Chemical Waste, 504 U.S. at 344-45 (citing City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978)). "In sum, we find the additional fee to be 'an
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full operation of the petitioner's facility. 100 In a similar case, Oregon
Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of the State of
Oregon,10 1 the Supreme Court extended its analysis of surcharge
statutes and held that states may not charge different fees for in10 2
state and out-of-state waste.
To date, courts have been very reluctant to allow states to restrict or limit the flow of waste between states. 103 Courts seem unsympathetic to the fact that certain states bear the brunt of the
10 4
nation's waste management and disposal crisis.
D. Judicial Exceptions
1. Death or Disease
The Supreme Court has upheld discriminatory laws where the
discrimination was justified by the threat of death or disease. 1 5 In
Maine v. Taylor,10 6 Taylor, an operator of a bait business, arranged
to have live golden shiners delivered to him from outside the
obvious effort to saddle those outside the State' with most of the burden of slowing
the flow of waste into the Emelle facility." Id. at 346.
100. See id. at 342. "Such burdensome taxed imposed on interstate commerce
alone are generally forbidden: '[A] State may not tax a transaction or incident
more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the
State.'" Id. (quoting Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 642 (1984)).
101. 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
102. See id. at 108. Oregon imposed a $2.25 per ton surcharge on waste generated from other states and $0.85 per ton fee on waste generated within Oregon.
See id. at 93. The Court determined that the disparate surcharge based on the
origin of the garbage was discriminatory under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
See id. at 108. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun dissented, arguing
that the surcharge was a fair compensation because "Oregon solid waste producers
do not compete with out-of-state businesses in the sale of solid waste." Id. at 112.
103. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of NaturalRes., 504 U.S. 334 (1992); Chemical Waste v.
Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc., 504 U.S. 334 (1992); Oregon Waste Systems, Inc., 511 U.S.
93 (1994). These cases demonstrate the judiciary's reluctance to allow states to
control the flow of waste amongst the states. See id.
104. See generally Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2001). Virginia is the
second largest importer of MSW, however, this fact was incidental to the Fourth
Circuit as it struck down provisions of Virginia's statute enacted to deal with this
incredible influx of MSW. See id.; see also Verchick, supra note 2, at 1294. Current
evidence suggests that poorer states are the ones forced to accept a disproportionate responsibility for waste disposal. See Verchick, supra note 2, at 1294. When the
net import of waste is more than a disposal site can adequately maintain and manage, it is the poorer area that must deal with the subsequent nuisances and environmental hazards. See id.
105. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (demonstrating one instance when Court upheld discriminatory state law under Dormant Commerce
Clause).
106. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002

13

328

Villanova Environmental
Law Journal,
Vol.JouRNAL
13, Iss. 2 [2002], [Vol.
Art. 5
VILLANovA
ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw

XIII: p. 315

state. 107 The shipment was intercepted because Maine had a provision making the import of wildlife illegal, specifically the import of
live baitfish.' 0 8 Taylor contended that Maine's import ban unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce.1 0 9 The Court held the
statute constitutional because importation of live baitfish into
Maine posed two significant threats to the unique and fragile Maine
fisheries. 11 0 First, Maine's own golden shiners would be at risk of
attack by three types of parasites prevalent only in out-of-state
baitfish.11 1 Second, nonnative species inadvertently placed in the
shipments could disturb Maine's aquatic ecology. 112 The Court
held that "[a]s long as a State does not needlessly obstruct interstate trade or attempt to 'place itself in a position of economic isolation,' it retains broad regulatory authority to protect the health and
13
safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural resources."
Maine v. Taylor is often characterized as a "modern" quarantine
case, and many states facing a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge have attempted to invoke this exception especially with respect to waste.1 14 Nevertheless, courts have been unwilling to
1 15
recognize any significant correlation.

107. See id. at 132 (discussing facts of case).
108. See id. A federal grand jury in the District of Maine indicted Taylor for
violating the Lacey Act Amendments. See id. These amendments make it a federal
crime "to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in interstate
or foreign commerce... any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported or sold
in violation of any law or regulation of any State or in violation of any foreign law."
Id. at 132-33 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (2002)).
109. See id. at 133 (noting Taylor's argument that Maine's import ban unconstitutionally burdens interstate commerce).
110. See id. at 140-41 (discussing Supreme Court's holding where statute withstood strict scrutiny).
111. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 141 (discussing unique threat importation
of live baitfish would have on fragile Maine fisheries).
112. See id. at 141 (discussing second unique threat importation of live
baitfish would have on Maine's fragile fisheries).
113. Id. at 151 (explaining Court's reasoning for upholding ban on importation of live baitfish).
114. SeeVerchick, supra note 2, at 1278 (discussing exception Supreme Court
carved out in Maine v. Taylor). The Supreme Court's exception in Maine v. Taylor
remains a mystery for many. See id. Maine indeed had a means to test imported
fish, however, it would have been costly. See id. Furthermore, the Court failed to
consider why Maine has not already enacted protectionist provisions. See id. For
example, the same fish that were banned from Maine could swim into Maine from
New Hampshire. See id.
115. See, e.g., Waste Mgmt. Holding Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2001).
In Waste Management, the Fourth Circuit disregarded any application of the analysis
in Maine v. Taylor by distinguishing the two cases based on their facts. See id. at 344
n.10.
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2.

Market ParticipantDoctrine

In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,'1 6 the Supreme Court determined that a state government can overcome the restrictions of the
Dormant Commerce Clause when it acts as a "market participant,"
as opposed to a "market regulator." 117 A state is a "market participant" when its role in the market is analogous to that of a private
company. 1 8 For example, the Commerce Clause does not allow a
state to regulate the market in favor of its own citizens, however, it
does not restrict a state when participating in the market to favor its
own citizens.11 9
The market participant doctrine has been limited in application by the Supreme Court. 120 The Court has indicated that the
exception may not apply when a state attempts to hoard its natural
resources. 12 1 The Supreme Court has also attempted to define the
116. 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (holding statutory scheme did not constitute impermissible burden on interstate commerce).
117. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. at 807-10. The Supreme
Court recognized the market participant exception for the first time in Hughes. See
id. In Hughes, the Court upheld Maryland's preferential treatment of state residents with respect to the purchase of abandoned cars. See id. The Court's reasoning for upholding Maryland's preferential treatment was that Maryland was
acting as a market participant. See id. The Court noted, "[n]othing in the purpose
animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional
action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own
citizens over others." Id. at 810. Subsequent cases affirmed the market participant
exception. See New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277 (1988) (declining to apply market participant doctrine to facts but endorsing validity of doctrine); see also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 (1980) (holding South
Dakota's preferential treatment of state residents with respect to sale of cement
produced by state-owned cement plant fell under market participant exception).
118. See Kurten, supra note 49, at 278 (explaining market participant
exception).
119. See Verchick, supra note 2, at 1280. "The doctrine... encourages states
to give up their traditional regulatory roles in the area of waste transportation and
to enter the fray of the market as one of many economic actors." Id. at 1281.
120. See Kurten, supra note 49, at 280-81 (discussing how Supreme Court has
limited market participant doctrine).
121. See id. There is a distinction between natural resources and state-created
resources. See id. States can be considered market participants when the landfill is
more than just land and requires state expenditure and human capital to facilitate.
See id. In Maryland, Rhode Island, and Washington, D.C. statutes were enacted
banning the disposal of MSW from out-of-state in publicly owned landfills. See id.
The Court upheld these statutes, reasoning that the involved governments were
participating in "landfill services" as opposed to "pure natural resource market."
See Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204, 1218-19 (D.R.I. 1987) (determining validity of market participant exception with respect to state's ban on importation of out-of-state MSW); Shayne Bros. v. District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp.
1128, 1134 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding ban on MSW from out-of-state valid under market participant exception); County Comm'rs of Charles County v. Stevens, 473
A.2d 12, 21-22 (Md. 1984) (holding ban on importation of MSW from out-of-state
valid under market participant exception).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002

15

330

Villanova Environmental
Law Journal,
Vol.JouRNAL
13, Iss. 2 [2002], Art.
5
VILLANOVA
ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw
[Vol.

XIII: p. 315

contours of state involvement, stating that if there is no "direct state
122
involvement in the market," the Commerce Clause applies.
E.

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),
administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), establishes minimum federal standards for dealing with hazardous
waste. 123 Most notably, RCRA allows states to implement their own
hazardous waste program instead of adhering to federal requirements. 124 In order to qualify, the state's program must be
"equivalent to" and "consistent with" the federal program and provide for "adequate enforcement of compliance." 12 5 Congress delegated to EPA the task of overseeing and authorizing state
programs. 126 Some have argued that since RCRA authorizes the
creation of state programs, Congress intended to authorize state
discrimination against MSW generated out-of-state.1 27 The justification behind this view is derived from the fact that EPA must approve each state program. 128 The issue of whether RCRA trumps
the Dormant Commerce Clause, though raised before the Supreme
129
Court, has never been decided.
Additionally, the issue has come before different circuit courts
without success.' 30 For example, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that
122. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S.
564, 592-93 (1997) (citing White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers,
Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 208 (1983)) (noting in order to have protection of market
participant doctrine, state must directly participate in market).
123. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (2000)
[hereinafter RCRA] (setting minimal federal standards).
124. See id. (allowing states to implement their own programs upon EPA
approval).
125. Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774, 779 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b)) (discussing parameters of RCRA).
126. See id. at 779 (noting EPA has authority over state-implemented programs pursuant to RCRA).
127. See id. at 782 (assessing argument that authorization of such state discrimination would displace Dormant Commerce Clause).
128. See id. at 782-83 (discussing necessary Congressional intent to displace
Dormant Commerce Clause implications).
129. See id. at 783 n.13. Specifically, the Supreme Court has not addressed
the issue of Congressional intent under RCRA. See id. In Chemical Waste, the issue
was raised by the amici curiae, but the Court declined to decide the issue because
it was not raised or considered by the lower court. See id.
130. See, e.g., Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 317 (4th Cir.
2001); Envtl. Tech. Counci4 98 F.3d 774, 775 (4th Cir. 1996). In both cases Plaintiffs
attempted to argue that Congress intended RCRA to trump the Dormant Commerce Clause. See Envtl. Tech. Council 98 F.3d at 775; see also Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d
at 317. The Court of Appeals disagreed in both cases. See id.
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without "unmistakably clear congressional intent to permit states to
burden interstate commerce" or "any further persuasive evidence
indicating that Congress intended to permit the states to directly or
by EPA authorization, to engage in actions otherwise violative of the
Commerce Clause," the argument lacks merit.1 3 1 It is unlikely that
circuit courts will carve out an exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis under RCRA in light of the Supreme Court's
13 2
decisions in City of Philadelphiaand Fort Gratiot.
F.

Virginia and Waste

1 33
Virginia is the nation's second highest waste importing state.
In 1992, Virginia was the fifth largest importer of waste in the
United States.1 34 Virginia moved up three ranks by 1995, becoming
second only to Pennsylvania. 13 5 In 1992, Virginia imported 1.5 mil-

lion tons of MSW. 1 36 By the end of 1998, this figure increased to
4.6 million tons of MSW.13 7 In just six years, the figure increased by

300 percent. 38 Figures for 1999 determined that Virginia took in
139
4.8 million tons of total waste.

One reason Virginia's MSW intake is so high is due to exports
from New York. 140 Since 1997, Fresh Kills, a New York landfill, has
slowly been decreasing its intake in anticipation of its closure by the
end of 2001 .141 Fresh Kills is located in Richmond County and is a
131. Envtl. Tech. Council, 98 F.3d at 783 (quoting Hazardous Waste Treatment
Council v. State of South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 792 (4th Cir. 1991)) (noting
unmistakably clear Congressional intent is paramount in order to make justified
argument).
132. See City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (holding that
a state cannot restrict the flow of interstate waste); see also Fort GratiotSanitary Landfill, Inc. v. MichiganDep't of NaturalRes., 504 U.S. 353 (1992) (reiterating holding in
City of Philadelphia).
133. See Davies, supra note 14, at 280-81 (noting Virginia's waste intake in
1992 compared to 1998).
134. See id. (discussing Virginia's rapid growth of waste intake).
135. See id. (commenting that such increase would lead to need for political
action).
136. See id. at 281 (noting Virginia's waste intake in 1992).
137. See id. (examining increase of waste in Virginia throughout 1990).
138. See Davies, supra note 14, at 281 (demonstrating percentile increase of
waste transported and deposited in Virginia).
139. See6 WASTE NEWS 35, (Jan. 29, 2001), availableat 2001 WL 8865916 (discussing Virginia's waste intake).
140. See Patrick Golden, New York State's Recycling Exports Continue to Increase, 41
WORLD WASTES 10 (Oct. 1, 1998), available at 1998 WL 14436611. New York's
Fresh Kills landfill operated for a long period of time and was exceptionally large.
See id.
141. See Waste Mgmt. Holdings,Inc. v. Gilmore, 87 F. Supp. 2d 536, 539 (E.D. Va.
2000) (discussing disposal of MSW generated in New York City).
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3,000-acre landfill that has operated for nearly 50 years. 14 2 As a result, nearly 3.5 million tons of MSW generated in New York has to
be exported elsewhere. 143 Virginia was awarded two contracts with
New York for the export of MSW and is in the process of negotiat144
ing a third contract.
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Narrative Analysis

The Fourth Circuit, in Waste Management, considered whether
the district court erred in granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment. 45 The district court found that the 1999 Virginia statute, restricting the importation of MSW into Virginia landfills, was
unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Supremacy Clause. 146 The Fourth Circuit applied the two-tier test
to determine the constitutionality of the statute challenged under
the Dormant Commerce Clause. 14 7 The court analyzed the statute
under the first tier, contemplating whether the state law discriminates facially, in practical effect, or in its purpose.1 48 Because the
parties agreed that the statutory provisions were not facially discriminatory against MSW generated outside Virginia, the court considered whether the statutory provisions discriminated in their
149
practical effect or in their purpose.
With respect to practical effect, the Fourth Circuit determined
that a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning the Cap
Provision, Stacking Provision, Three Rivers' Ban, Trucking Certification Provision, and the Four or More Axel Provision. 15 0 With re142. See Golden, supra note 140, at 10 (discussing size and location of Fresh
Kills landfill).
143. See id. (discussing impact of closing Fresh Kills landfill).
144. See Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 326 (4th Cir. 2001)
(discussing Virginia's contracts to import waste from New York). This third contract considered the disposal of 12,000 tons of residential waste per day from Manhattan, Queens, Brooklyn and the Bronx for a period of twenty years. See id.
145. See id. at 324 (discussing lower court's holding and issue facing Fourth
Circuit).
146. See id. (discussing district court's holding).
147. See id. at 333 (analyzing two-tier approach utilized in determining constitutionality of statutory provision challenged under Dormant Commerce Clause).
148. See id. (citing Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774, 785 (4th Cir.
1996)) (discussing approach taken in determining constitutionality of statutory
provision challenged under Dormant Commerce Clause).
149. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 334 (examining elements involved in part
one of two-tiered test).
150. See id. at 335. The Fourth Circuit found that it was unclear whether the
particular statute discriminated in practical effect, thus raising a genuine issue of
material fact. See id.
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spect to discriminatory purpose, however, the Fourth Circuit
determined the evidence clearly demonstrated that Virginia wanted
to protect itself from further increases in the level of MSW generated outside the state being dumped within the state's borders. 15 1
In fact, the court stated that, "[n] o reasonable juror could find the
statutory provisions at issue had a purpose other than to reduce the
flow of MSW from states with less strict limitations upon the content
1 52
of MSW than Virginia.
Once the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Virginia statute
was discriminatory in its purpose, the court shifted its focus to the
second tier, determining whether Virginia had a constitutionally
valid reason for its discrimination.1 5 3 Defendants bore the burden
of proffering sufficient evidence for each provision of the statute so
that a reasonable juror could determine that a valid reason existed. 154 Defendants' main argument was that the importation of
MSW from other states into Virginia raised significant health and
safety concerns not presented by Virginia waste. 155 Specifically, Defendants stressed that state laws concerning hazardous waste that
were not as encompassing or as strict as the Virginia statute create a
particularly acute problem.'

56

Defendants cited Maine v. Taylor to

151. See id. at 340-41. In order to determine whether there was a discriminatory purpose, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the four factors set forth in Sylvia Dev.
Corp. v. Maryland. See id. at 336. These four factors include (1) evidence of a consistent pattern; (2) the historical background of the decision; (3) the specific consequence of events leading up to decision; and (4) decision-makers contemporary
statements. See Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Maryland, 48 F.3d 810, 819 (4th Cir. 1995). As
part of the analysis, the Fourth Circuit examined press releases which clearly illustrated a marked tension between Governor Gilmore and Rudolf Giuliani concerning the export of New York waste to Virginia. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 336-40.
152. Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 340 (noting tension between Virginia and New
York Governors concerning New York's plan to export waste).
153. See id. at 341. Since the Fourth Circuit found a discriminatory purpose,
it applied strict scrutiny. See id. at 334.
154. See id. at 341 (citing Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774, 785
(4th Cir. 1996)). To justify a provision, its supporters must show that it is "unrelated to economic protectionism, and that no non discriminatory alternatives existed." Id.
155. See id. at 341 (focusing upon environmental and health hazards associated with exporting municipal solid waste).
156. See id. at 341. The Fourth Circuit stated:
Defendants .

.

. offered evidence demonstrating . .

.:

(1) that certain

materials in MSW can be hazardous to human health; (2) that each state
has its own definition of MSW; (3) that "[w]hile one state may find it
appropriate to regulate strictly a certain type of solid waste, another state
may not be as aware of or concerned about the risks posed by that type of
item into the MSW stream"; (4) that Virginia law completely prohibits
potentially infectious items such as blood and urine from being disposed
of as MSW, while Maryland and North Carolina allow disposal of blood
and urine as MSW under limited circumstances; (5) that Virginia law pro-
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support Virginia's environmental and health concerns. 15 7 In Taylor,
the Supreme Court made an exception to the Dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine stating that the law at issue was justified by the
158
threat of death or disease.
The Fourth Circuit found that the Defendants met their burden of establishing a reason other than economic protectionism to
justify the statutory provisions.' 59 However, the Fourth Circuit
stated that Defendants not only had the burden of demonstrating
that valid factors existed for the discriminatory statute, but also
bore the burden of establishing that the statutory provisions were
the least discriminatory means of addressing Virginia's MSW concern.' 60 In this regard, the Fourth Circuit addressed each statutory
provision independently.' 6 1 With respect to the Cap Provision, Defendants argued that, in order to deal with the increased level of
MSW, the import volume must be limited.1 6 2 Only then could Virginia adequately employ its police powers and effectively screen and
treat the waste for potential hazards. 16 3 The Fourth Circuit, like
Plaintiffs, disagreed with Defendants, noting that the "Cap Provihibits urine from being disposed of as MSW while New York allows its
disposal as MSW without limitation; (6) that Maryland and New York allow hazardous waste generated at less than 100 kilograms per month to
be disposed of as MSW while Virginia does not; and (7) that unlike Virginia, Maryland and New York do not impose manifesting or tracking
requirements on hazardous waste from small quantity generators.
Id. at 341-42 (internal citations omitted).
157. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 341.
158. See id. The Defendants argued that the health and environmental
hazards associated with transporting large quantities of MSW should warrant the
Supreme Court's exception to discriminatory laws found in Maine v. Taylor. See id.
at 341-42; see also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 140 (1986).
159. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 342 (noting Defendants provided sufficient
evidence demonstrating genuine issue of material fact existed as to justification of
statute).
160. See id. (discussing another important element under two-tier strict scrutiny test for determining constitutionality of statute challenged under Dormant
Commerce Clause).
161. See id. at 343-45 (examining whether each statutory provision was least
discriminatory alternative).
162. See id. at 342 (discussing Plaintiffs' argument with respect to Cap
Provision).
163. See id. at 342. The Defendants argued that adding inspectors was only
one component to the waste-screening process. See id. In fact, "high volumes of
waste make inspecting waste even more difficult and exacerbate an ongoing problem." Id. Screening waste not only includes visual inspection but also chemical
testing to determine whether other hazards exist which the human eye cannot
detect. See id. at 343. If unauthorized waste is found it must be removed and
processed. See id. With increased volumes of waste, Virginia argued that it would
have to develop specific treatment facilities and this process would slow operations,
lowering the daily intake to lower than 2,000-tons a day. See id.
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sion makes no effort to distinguish between the MSW of states ac' 164
cording to an individual state's level of MSW regulation."
Therefore, because other alternatives existed, the exception noted
a6 5
in Taylor did not apply
With respect to the Stacking Provisions and the Three Rivers'
Ban, the Fourth Circuit determined that these were the least discriminatory alternatives. 16 6 The Fourth Circuit relied on sworn
statements from the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality
(DEQ) that outlined serious and unique health threats as a result of
waste transportation via water to determine that a genuine issue of
material fact existed to deny Summary Judgment. 167 However, as to
the Trucking Certification Provision and the Four or More Axel
Provision, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Defendants failed to
prove that these were the least burdensome alternatives.1 68 Defendants argued that the court should give the same deference to these
provisions as is given to state legislatures in the area of highway
safety. 169 The Fourth Circuit found this argument weak in light of
the discriminatory purpose of the Provisions.1 70 The court thus up17 1
held the Plaintiffs' grant of Summary Judgment.

164. Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 343. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that interstate commerce would be burdened less if the Cap Provision only applied to states
with standards lower than Virginia's standard or the Cap Provision should vary
according to the standards of other states. See id. The Fourth Circuit stated that
because Virginia did not present evidence why it would not work, Virginia did not
meet its burden under the second prong of the strict scrutiny test. See id.
165. See id. at 344 n.10 (noting that Maine v. Taylor does not apply to this
situation because issue here is materially distinguishable).
166. See id. at 344 (holding that genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether Stacking Provision and Three Rivers' Ban were least discriminatory
alternatives).
167. See id. The Fourth Circuit cited interrogatories from the record which
indicated that, in 1993, thirty-three containers fell overboard due to improper lashing and, in 1994, a fire partially destroyed cargo on board a ship. See id.
168. See id. The Fourth Circuit stated that Defendants failed to show affirmative evidence and instead relied on deference normally given to state legislation
regarding highway safety. See id.
169. See Waste Mgmnt., 252 F.3d at 344-45 (discussing Plaintiffs' argument that
deference should be given to legislative judgments regarding highway safety).
170. See id. at 344-45 (citing Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450
U.S. 662, 675-76 (1981)). The Fourth Circuit relied on Kasse, which stands for the
proposition that less deference should be given to legislative judgments that bear
disproportionately on out-of-state residents and businesses. See id. at 344. The
Fourth Circuit also noted that because the statute was found to be discriminatory
in its purpose, Virginia's political process would not serve as a check against unduly burdensome regulations. See id. at 345.
171. See id. at 345 (finding that Trucking Provision and Four or More Axel
Provision were not least burdensome alternatives).
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Defendants sought to avoid confrontation with the Dormant
Commerce Clause altogether by asserting two separate grounds that
the Fourth Circuit should consider. 172 First, Defendants sought
protection under the market participant doctrine. 17 The Fourth
Circuit dismissed the application of this doctrine in three
sentences.1 74 Specifically, the court determined that the Dormant
Commerce Clause applied in full force in this instance because the
state was acting as a market regulator and not a private
participant.175

Second, the Defendants argued that, under RCRA, Congress
intended to authorize state implementation programs that discriminate against MSW, thus overriding the Dormant Commerce
Clause. 176 The Fourth Circuit relied on Environmental Technology
Council v. Sierra Club177 to support its contention that, in order to
allow a state law to be removed from the reach of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, Congressional intent must be expressly stated or
unmistakably clear. 178 The court noted that Defendants had the
burden of identifying congressional intent. 179 Here, Defendants
pointed to a RCRA provision, encouraging the states to consider
certain factors in assessing and addressing their solid waste
problems to argue that Congress gave the states the authority to
protect local interests.' 8 0 Defendants also asserted that certain legislative history demonstrated that Congress intended state pro172. See id.
173. See id. (discussing market participant doctrine as exception to Dormant

Commerce Clause).
174. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 345 (noting court only briefly considered
market participant doctrine).
175. See id. (citing Waste Mgmt. Holdings Inc. v. Gilmore, 64 F. Supp. 2d 537, 544
(E.D. Va. 1999)). The district court noted:
The Commonwealth's argument that the market participant exception
applies to this case requires little discussion. Virginia is not acting like a
private participant in the waste disposal market. It is attempting to regu-

late the conduct of others in that market as only a state, as state, can do.
The market participant doctrine therefore offers it no protection.
Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 544.
176. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 245.
177. 98 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 1996)
178. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 346 (discussing requirements for state law to

be removed from reach of federal law).
179.
intent).
180.
referred
hydrolic
affecting

See id. at 346-47 (discussing standard for unmistakable Congressional
See id. at 346; see also 42 U.S.C. § 6942(c) (2000). The factors Defendants
to included population density, population growth, geographical and
characteristics as well as political, financial and management problems
waste management. See id.
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grams to override the Dormant Commerce Clause.1 8 1 The Fourth
Circuit simply stated that the language Defendants cited was broad
and did not "come close to expressing an 'unmistakably clear' in182
tent on the part of Congress."
Lastly, the Fourth Circuit addressed Plaintiffs' argument that
the Three Rivers' Ban and the Stacking Provision violated the
Supremacy Clause under the Constitution. 183 The first question
the Court addressed was whether state law conflicted with federal
law. 184 The Fourth Circuit noted that states are permitted to exercise their police powers as long as the state law does not prohibit
the accomplishment of the full purpose and objective of the federal
law. 18 5 Under the Supremacy Clause, vessels having appropriate
documentation may engage in coastwide trade. 186 Here, the Virginia statute completely excluded federally licensed commerce on
three waterways. 18 7 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit held that a
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether federal law
should preempt state law in light of the health and environmental
risks associated with stacking containers more than two barges
high. 188

181. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 346-47. Defendants cited numerous "snippets" of legislative history. See id. One clip included, "[I] n formulating a state plan
it is the Committee's intention to permit wide flexibility on the part of the state
developing such plan so that each state can plan for its particular problems." See
id.at 346 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1491 at 35 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N
6238, 6273).
182. Id. at 347 (internal citation omitted) (holding that language Defendants
cited does not demonstrate Congress' unmistakable intent).
183. See id. at 347-48. The real issue revolved around the federal documentation provisions governing vessels in coastwide trade and whether states could encroach on this regulation. See id. at 348.
184. See id. at 348. "The Supreme Court has held that a federal license confers upon the licensee a right to operate freely in each state's waters, subject only
to legitimate exercises of the state's police power." Id. (citing Douglas v. Seacoast
Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 281 (1977).
185. See id. at 348 (noting that, in light of state police powers, states may regulate federal licensees in reasonable, non discriminatory manner).
186. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 348 (citing 46 U.S.C. §§ 12103, 12106
(2000)) (discussing parameters of Supremacy Clause).
187. See id. at 348 (discussing provision of Virginia statute and reasonableness
of state encroachment upon federal provision).
188. See id. (holding genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to
whether state law preempts federal law under Supremacy Clause).
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Critical Analysis

The Fourth Circuit's decision, in Waste Management, is consistent with previous Supreme Court interstate waste decisions.1 8 9
However, the Fourth Circuit's analysis demonstrates the difficulty
lower courts have in applying the Dormant Commerce Clause to
independent facts. 1 90 Yet, the court's analysis in some areas provides a new approach for considering environmental and health
concerns, mirroring some of Chief Justice Rehnquist's arguments
in his dissenting opinions.19 1
1.

DiscriminatoryPurpose is Not Unmistakably Clear

The Fourth Circuit examined the first tier of the two-tier statutory test for statutes challenged under the Dormant Commerce
Clause to determine whether the law discriminates facially, in its
practical effect or purpose.1 9 2 The Fourth Circuit determined that
the evidence "unmistakably" demonstrated that the statute was enacted with a discriminatory purpose. 193 The court followed the factors set forth in Sylvia Development Corporation v. Maryland and held
that "the record in this case established that no reasonable juror
could find that in enacting the statutory provision at issue Virginia's
General Assembly acted without a discriminatory purpose."1 94 The
evidence the court relied upon were press releases and statements
from Senator Bolling, Mayor Giuliani, and Governor Gilmore.1 95
Yet, loathing for imported garbage by a few does not mean it is
despised by an entire General Assembly. 19 6 Furthermore, discerning legislative intent is a very hazy endeavor over which the Su189. See Davies, supra note 14, at 290-91 (discussing how holding of Waste
Management is consistent with Supreme Court's view of interstate waste).
190. See id. at 247-53 (discussing difficulty lower courts have in applying Dormant Commerce Clause).
191. For a discussion of Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinions in previous
interstate waste cases, see supra notes 83-84 and 92-93 and accompanying text.
192. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 333-34 (discussing Dormant Commerce
Clause test).

193. See id. at 340 (noting that Virginia statute had an unmistakable discriminatory purpose).
194. Id. at 336 (citing Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Maryland, 48 F.3d 810, 819 (4th Cir.
1995)) (noting four factors worthy of consideration when determining whether

statute discriminates on its purpose). For a discussion of the four factors discussed
in Sylvia, see supra note 65.
195. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 336-41 (discussing evidence Court relied

upon to find discriminatory purpose).
196. See Davies, supra note 14, at 290 (noting that thoughts of few legislators
cannot be determinative of every legislator's view).
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preme Court has often struggled. 97 Despite Defendants' attempt
to demonstrate the statute's neutrality, the Fourth Circuit did not
consider factors other than the political feud between New York
and Virginia in its analysis. 198
In order to determine whether the Virginia statute discriminated in its purpose, the court could have looked at the legislative
history and the increased amount of MSW being disposed of in Virginia before the beginning of the feud with New York. The Virginia
statute created an evenhanded restriction on how MSW could enter
Virginia and be disposed of once in the state. 199 The same restrictions were placed on in-state and out-of-state MSW. 200 The Virginia

statute did not seek to cease importing waste from out-of-state, but
20 1
to reduce the amount of waste coming to the state per day.
Moreover, Virginia argued that, despite the political fervor between
New York's Mayor Giuliani and Virginia's Governor Gilmore, the
statute was enacted for neutral reasons stemming from the concern
of the rapid growth of MSW being deposited in Virginia. 20 2 The
court dismissed this contention, finding the evidence of discrimina20 3
tion clear.
In light of the Supreme Court's previous holdings striking
down state statutes that sought to limit or restrict the amount of
MSW being imported into a state, it is not surprising that the
197. See id. (citing Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism
in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implicationsfor the Legislative History
Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. Rrv. 1 (1998)) (exploring difficulty determining
legislative intent).
198. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 341. Defendants attempted to argue that the
statute was implemented for neutral reasons seeking to protect the health, safety
and welfare of Virginia residents. See id.
199. See id. at 323-24 (discussing five statutory provisions).
200. See id. For example, both in-state and out-of-state waste was subject to the
2,000-ton Cap Provision as well as the Trucking Provision. See id. at 324.
201. See id. at 342-43. Defendants relied on statements by Virginia's director
of DEQ who asserted that the cap statute was enacted to allow the Commonwealth
to better protect health and safety. See id. at 342.
202. See id. at 340. Defendants contended that a genuine issue of material
fact existed with respect to whether the statute was enacted with a discriminatory
intent. See id. Defendants suggested that a post-enactment statement from Senator Boiling demonstrated that the statute was enacted for neutral reasons. See id.
Senator Bolling stated that he sponsored the statute because of his concern over
the rapid growth of the volume of MSW being deposited in Virginia landfills "regardless of the source." Id. The court, however, dismissed Defendants' contention
that a genuine issue of material fact existed and stated "[d] efendants cannot create
a genuine issue of material fact by presenting conflicting sworn statements as they
have done with respect to the issue of discriminatory intent." Id. at 341. (citing
Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 960 (4th Cir. 1984)).
203. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 341 (holding discriminatory purpose was
clear).
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Fourth Circuit found the Virginia statute to have a discriminatory
purpose.2 0 4 However, one of the most critical aspects of the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis is determining whether a statute
20 5 If
should be analyzed under the first or second tier of the test.
discrimination is found, the Court's standard of review is strict scrutiny. 20 6 Strict scrutiny is a powerful tool that has been used to inval20 7
idate almost all waste restrictions.
2.

Reasons Other than Economic Protectionism

The Fourth Circuit correctly applied the second prong of the
20 8
first tier test under a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge.
Once a court determines that the statute is discriminatory on its
face, purpose, or effect, the two-tier test requires the court to ask
whether Virginia has a constitutionally valid reason for engaging in
such discrimination. 20 9 Defendants presented evidence outlining
numerous environmental, health, and safety hazards that result
from MSW and the transport of MSW. 210 Furthermore, Defendants
204. See, e.g., City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); see also Fort
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of NaturalRes., 504 U.S. 353 (1992).
In both of the above-cited cases the Supreme Court struck down statutes in which
the state tried to mitigate the effects of imported waste. See id.
205. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 340 (demonstrating that if statute is found to
be discriminatory on its face, practical effect or purpose, then strict scrutiny will be
applied).
206. See id.
207. See Verchick, supra note 2, at 1272. "The Court's rigidity in applying the
[Dormant] Commerce Clause is inconsistent with other areas of constitutional
analysis and is much harder to justify on traditional constitutional grounds." Id. at
1283.
208. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 342 (agreeing that safety risks justified statute on grounds other than economic protectionism).
209. See Envtl. Tech. Council, 98 F.3d 774, 785 (4th Cir. 1996) (setting forth
two-tier approach for determining constitutionality of statutory provision challenged under Dormant Commerce Clause).
210. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 341-42. Defendants offered evidence:
1) that certain materials in MSW can be hazardous to human health; 2)
that each state has its own definition of MSW; 3) that while one state may
find it appropriate to regulate strictly a certain type of solid waste, another state may not be as aware of or concerned about the risks posed by
that type of item into the MSW stream; 4) that Virginia law completely
prohibits potentially infectious items such as blood and urine from being
disposed of as MSW, while Maryland and North Carolina allow disposal of
blood and urine as MSW under limited circumstances; 5) that Virginia
law prohibits urine from being disposed of as MSW while New York allows
its disposal as MSW without limitation; 6) that Maryland and New York
allow hazardous waste generated at less than 100 kilograms per month to
be disposed of as MSW while Virginia does not; and 7) that unlike Virginia, Maryland and New York do not impose manifesting or tracking
requirements on hazardous waste from small quantity generators.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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demonstrated that MSW generated outside of Virginia is different
from that which is generated inside Virginia and, therefore, poses
more serious health and safety risks.2 11 The court correctly noted
that Defendants satisfied their burden of establishing that the statutory provisions were justified by a reason other than economic
protectionism.

21 2

The Fourth Circuit's finding that there was sufficient evidence
that the Virginia statute was enacted for ajustified reason steps away
from the Supreme Court's original analysis of the nature of interstate waste in City of Philadelphiaand Fort Gratiot.2 13 In both cases,
2

14

the Supreme Court found undisputed economic, protectionism.
In City of Philadelphia, the Court stated, "whatever [New Jersey's]
ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating
against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless
there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently." 215 The Supreme Court, however, rejected the notion that
environmental concerns and hazards posed by landfilling satisfied
21 6
burdening commerce.
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the Virginia statute
could be construed as a health and safety regulation, adopting
some of the ideas scattered throughout Chief Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in both City of Philadelphiaand Fort Gratiot.2 17 Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dissenting opinions largely addressed environmental
hazards connected with interstate waste and noted that states
should be free to prohibit the importation of solid waste because of
the potential health and safety problems that it poses to re211. See id. at 342 (noting that "MSW generated outside Virginia poses health
and safety risks not posed by MSW generated inside Virginia.").
212. See id. (noting statutory provisions did not advance economic protectionism).
213. See id. (finding health and safety risks Defendant presented sufficient to
establish reasons for enactment outside economic protectionism).
214. See City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978) (holding
NewJersey law is protectionist in nature); see also Fort GratiotSanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Michigan Dep't of NaturalRes., 504 U.S. 334, 366 (1992) (holding portion of Michigan law as protectionist measure that cannot withstand scrutiny under Commerce
Clause).
215. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27 (discussing possibility of finding
evil of protectionism in both legislative means and legislative ends).
216. See id. at 628 (noting that one state cannot isolate itself from problems
common to many states by erecting barrier). The Court rejected Defendants' contention that this statute fits within the quarantine exception, thus validating the
protectionist nature of the statute. See id. at 628-29.
217. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 343 (stating health and safety risks presented
by importation of MSW with less strict regulatory standards could establish justified
reason for statute).
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The Fourth Circuit's willingness to consider environ-

mental hazards as a sufficient reason for the statute is an affirmative
acknowledgement that waste disposal is an important issue which
2 19
must be reevaluated.
3. Least Discriminatory Means
While the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the statutory provisions were justified by a reason other than economic protectionism, the court's analysis of the last part of the Dormant Commerce
220
Clause requires evaluation.
a. Cap Provision - The Wrong Outcome
Concerning the Cap Provision, the Fourth Circuit found that
less discriminatory means of regulation existed. 2 21 Defendants contended that the Cap Provision was a necessary and appropriate response to the MSW volume crisis. 222 Defendants stated that the
Cap Provision allowed Virginia to better protect the health and
safety of its citizens because a 2,000-ton cap of MSW can be reasonably managed and policed. 223 In response, Plaintiffs argued if Defendants worried about the composition of MSW generated outside
of Virginia, then Virginia should only cap the amount of waste imported from states with MSW regulatory schemes less restrictive
than Virginia. 224 Additionally, the closer a state's MSW regulatory
2 25
scheme mirrors that of Virginia, the higher the cap should be.
218. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 632 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent focused on the environmental concerns associated with landfilling and suggested that states should be able to protect their citizens from these potential health and safety hazards. See id. Chief Justice
Rehnquist's interpretation of the Dormant Commerce Clause test suggests that
courts should give substantial weight to the local health and environmental benefits of landfill reduction provisions. See Breitenbucher, supra note 7, at 251-53.
219. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 341-42 (evaluating environmental hazards
Defendants presented).
220. See id. at 342 (discussing least discriminatory prong of test under Dormant Commerce Clause challenge).
221. See id. at 343-44 (finding less discriminatory means existed).
222. See id. at 342-43 (arguing Cap Provision was necessary to police out-ofstate MSW).
223. See id. at 342 (contending more inspections can take place to adequately
screen and process waste with less MSW being imported each day).
224. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 343 (noting Plaintiffs' contention that less
discriminatory means outside universal cap provision existed). Plaintiffs also
noted that the Cap Provision could be less restrictive by making the cap correspond to Virginia's regulatory scheme. See id. For example, the more closely a
state's MSW regulatory scheme is to Virginia's, the higher the cap should be. See
id.
225. See id. (discussing Plaintiffs' example of less burdensome alternative).
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The Fourth Circuit agreed with Plaintiffs, noting that Defendants
showed no evidence as to why a more narrow capping provision
would not adequately address the health and safety concerns the
2 26
Virginia statute was enacted to protect.
While Plaintiffs' contention that a tailored Cap Provision is less
discriminatory, practically, a scheme like this poses significant challenges of its own. A narrower capping provision based on each
state's MSW regulatory scheme contravenes the principles of uniformity, an issue important to interstate commerce. 22 7 Such a provision would require Virginia to analyze each state's regulatory
scheme for MSW and create different caps based on their findings. 228 With new technology, Virginia would have to continuously
change, update and revise the Cap Provision, inevitably causing
confusion and perceptions of disproportionate discrimination.
A uniform Cap Provision is a more evenhanded restriction
which would allow all states the same access to the landfills but
229
would allow Virginia a greater opportunity to manage its waste.
In fact, the Supreme Court condoned such a statutory scheme in
both City of Philadelphia and Fort Gratiot.23 0 The Supreme Court
noted that one plausible method of dealing with the influx of outof-state waste would be to limit or slow the flow of all waste into the
state's landfills, even though interstate commerce may be incidentally affected. 23 1 The Fourth Circuit, however, disagreed and
226. See id. (demonstrating less restrictive alternative to Cap Provision).
227. See id. at 333. The Fourth Circuit noted that if a statute regulates evenhandedly, the second tier of the Dormant Commerce Clause test applies instead of
the strict scrutiny, per se invalid tier of the test. See id. If a statute regulates evenhandedly, the Pike balancing test is applied. See id. (citing Envtl. Tech. Council v.
Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774, 785 (4th Cir. 1996)).
228. See id. at 343 (discussing Fourth Circuit's opinion regarding less discriminatory alternative). The Fourth Circuit stated, "rather than discriminating against
MSW from every state other than Virginia, Virginia's cap should only target the
MSW from states that have lesser health and safety standards regarding MSW than
Virginia." Id.
229. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 342-43 (discussing Virginia's argument that
Cap Provision is necessary precaution).
230. See City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey, 437 U.S 617, 626 (1978); see also Fort
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 367
(1992). In both City of Philadelphiaand Fort Gratiot, the Supreme Court suggested
that an evenhanded overall limitation on the amount of waste being imported into
a state would be a reasonable provision. See id.
231. See City of Philadelphia,437 U.S at 626; see also Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 367.
In both City of Philadelphiaand Fort Gratiot,the Court stated that a feasible alternative would be to create a uniform flow restriction affecting all waste coming into
the state. See id. The Court seemed to reason that a provision like this would be
less discriminatory against out-of-state waste and would regulate more evenhandedly. See id. The Fourth Circuit did not agree with this determination. See Waste
Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 343.
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thought that a variant Cap Provision would be less discriminatory
23 2
towards interstate commerce.
The Virginia statute followed the limited guidance provided by
the most analogous Supreme Court cases and still failed to overcome a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge. 233 Here, a uniform
Cap Provision as well as a state tailored Cap Provision are better
options than a complete ban on interstate waste or a surcharge to
deal with processing the more contaminated MSW. 234 The Fourth

Circuit agreed with the alternative Plaintiffs devised; however, because the court only had to determine whether a genuine issue of
material fact existed, it seems that a trier-of-fact should have been
used in this case to determine whether Plaintiffs' suggested alterna23 5
tive, if feasible, was indeed less discriminatory.
Furthermore, it is unclear whether the Fourth Circuit, in
agreeing with Plaintiffs that a less discriminatory means existed,
suggested that a Cap Provision would be acceptable as long as it was
tailored to the individual states or whether a Cap Provision could
only be applied to those states whose regulatory schemes were less
stringent than Virginia. 23 6 The Fourth Circuit's analysis of the Cap
Provision is confusing and demonstrates how the Supreme Court's
analysis of the Dormant Commerce Clause has resulted in lower
courts issuing incoherent and inconsistent decisions. 23 7 Dormant
Commerce Clause cases are so disparate that no state legislators,
lawyers, law students, academic authorities or the courts themselves
know clearly the analysis or rules concerning the Dormant Commerce Clause. 238 Overall, the Fourth Circuit's analysis of the Cap
Provision lacks structure, but, more importantly, leaves Virginia
232. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 343 (stating other less discriminatory alternatives were available).
233. See id. at 349 (indicating complexity of Dormant Commerce Clause
analysis).
234. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 629 (holding prohibition of im-

portation of interstate waste was violation of Commerce Clause).
235. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 329 (describing court's limited scope of review when reviewing grant of summary judgment).
236. See id. at 343-44. The Fourth Circuit agreed with Plaintiffs' contention
that capping those states with less stringent regulatory schemes would be a less
discriminatory method. See id. Plaintiffs, however, also noted that "the more
closely a state's MSW regulatory scheme tracks that of Virginia, the higher the cap
should be." Id. The Fourth Circuit did not clarify whether it agreed with this
analysis as well. See id.
237. See Davies, supra note 14, at 252-54 (discussing how Dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine has caused havoc for lower courts).
238. See id. at 254 (discussing disparate and unpredictable results of Dormant
Commerce Clause cases).
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without a clear understanding of what options it has for redesigning
the provision should it choose to do so.
b. Stacking Provision and the Three Rivers' Ban
The Fourth Circuit determined that Defendants submitted sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether the Stacking Provision and the Three Rivers' Ban were the
least discriminatory alternatives available. 2 39 The Fourth Circuit
strayed from the Supreme Court's traditional Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis demonstrated in City of Philadelphiaand Fort Gratiot
by focusing on the environmental concerns of Virginians with respect to the Stacking Provision and the Three Rivers' Ban. 240 The
Fourth Circuit determined that Defendants' evidence showed that
the transport of,waste through the waterways presented serious and
unique health and safety threats to Virginia residents. 241 While this
conclusion is not determinative, the Fourth Circuit's approach
demonstrates the recognition and importance of health concerns
involved with waste management. 242 In fact, the Fourth Circuit's
argument correlates to Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinions in City of Philadelphiaand Fort Gratiot.243 Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissents imply that the Dormant Commerce Clause, as
interpreted by the majority, produces potential environmental and
health problems of its own because it increases the distance waste
has to travel. 2 44 Increased distance inevitably creates increased risks
of spills, contamination and other environmental concerns. 24 5 The
239. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 344 (noting Defendants offer various pieces
of evidence to create genuine issues of material fact with regard to Stacking Provision and Three Rivers' Ban, requiring resolution by trier-of-fact).
240. See id. The Fourth Circuit seriously considered reports from DEQ suggesting that these provisions were necessary to protect the health and safety of
Virginia citizens. See id. The court stated that Defendants submitted sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact that should be resolved by a trier-offact. See id.
241. See id. (noting health and safety concerns involved with transport of
waste via waterway).
242. See id.
243. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629-33 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing disagreement with majority holding based on environmental, health, and safety concerns); see also Fort Gratiot SanitaryLandfill, Inc. v.
Michigan Dep't of NaturalRes., 504 U.S. 353, 368-73 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (illustrating basis of disagreement with majority holding based on state's legitimate local concerns rather than improper economic protectionism).
244. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 629-33; ForGratiot,504 U.S. at 36873.
245. See Davies, supra note 14, at 259 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's
dissenting opinions). An additional environmental criticism of the Dormant Commerce Clause, important to the doctrine's practical effect but omitted from Chief
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Fourth Circuit seemed to be heeding these warnings as it evaluated
24 6
Virginia's concerns in enacting these provisions.
c.

Trucking Provision and the Four or More Axel Provision

The Fourth Circuit correctly determined that the Trucking
Provision and the Four or More Axel Provision were not the least
discriminatory alternatives. 247 Defendants argued that state legislation should be given deference because it was analogous to highway
safety. 248 The Fourth Circuit properly noted that these regulations

disproportionately pressed upon out-of-state residents and businesses and therefore less deference was due. 249 Furthermore, the
Fourth Circuit stated that because the provisions were determined
to be discriminatory in their purpose, less deference should be
given to state legislative judgment because the presence of a discriminatory purpose undercuts the notion that Virginia's political
250
process would serve as a check against burdensome legislation.
The court assumed that the entire legislature was acting with a dis25 1
criminatory purpose when they enacted the statutory provisions.
The court's assumption demonstrates how critical an accurate and
thorough analysis of the first tier of the Dormant Commerce Clause
test is to the final outcome.
V.

IMPACT

The Fourth Circuit's decision, in Waste Management, is likely to
have little effect upon the judicial landscape of interstate waste.
This is partially due to the fact that the Fourth Circuit's holding was
based on a Summary Judgment determination. The fact that the
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinions, is the idea of risk multiplication. See id.
Allowing an unlimited amount of trash to be deposited in one state increases that

state's risk of being harmed. See id. at 259-60. For example, Virginia's waste importation has increased dramatically as a result Fresh Kills' closing. See id. Without

any restriction or limit on the amount of waste Virginia will accept, Virginia residents' exposure to harmful contaminants is increased proportionately to the increased amount of trash. See id.
246. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 344 (discussing environmental hazards).

247. See id. at 345 (striking down Trucking Provision and Four or More Axel
Provision).
248. See id. at 344-45 (discussing Defendants' argument with respect to Trucking Provision and Four or More Axel Provision).
249. See id. (citing Kassel v. ConsolidatedFreightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 675-76
(1981)) (explaining less deference should be given to legislative judgment where
local regulation bears disproportionately on out-of-state residents and businesses).
250. See id. at 345 (noting discriminatory purpose of Trucking Provision and
Four of More Axel Provision and commenting Virginia's political process would
not serve as check against potentially burdensome legislation).
251. See Waste Mgmt., 252 F.3d at 344-45.
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Fourth Circuit determined that Defendants had met their burden,
does not mean that the provision is constitutional. Furthermore,
Waste Management is not overwhelmingly significant because it is a
circuit court decision and the Supreme Court has already addressed
the issue of interstate waste. The Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Dormant Commerce Clause with respect to interstate waste may
not be completely logical in light of environmental hazards connected with landfilling, but the Supreme Court's protection of in252
terstate commerce might as well be set in stone.
On the other hand, "[o] ne generation's dissents have often become the rule of law years later." 25 3 :The. Fourth Circuit strayed
from the traditional Supreme Court analysis which focused on economic protectionism and ignored environmental concerns. 254 Instead, the Fourth Circuit adopted a subtle but modern approach to
considering state statutes challenged under the Dormant Commerce Clause. 2 55 The court's recognition and discussion of the environmental, safety, and health hazards that the importation of
MSW poses demonstrates the nature of the MSW disposal crises in
the United States. The Fourth Circuit seemed to acknowledge
Chief'Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, understanding that the importation of waste is a multi-faceted operation in which states should be able to protect their citizens and resources. 256 However, while this approach projects a
more humanitarian view toward waste disposal and may be emulated in subsequent cases, it is unlikely that health, safety, or environmental concerns will be enough to overcome the Supreme
Court's protection of interstate commerce.
While the Supreme Court as currently constituted seems unlikely to overrule itself on this issue, small acknowledgements of the
environmental and health implications of interstate waste by the
lower courts and Congress may lend a helping hand. Congress has
the authority to regulate interstate commerce; waste control is in-

252. See Davies, supra note 14, at 232 (discussing unlikelihood that Supreme
Court will ever overrule Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine).
253. Breitenbucher, supra note 7, at 249 (noting possibility of subsequent
changes in Supreme Court's views).
254. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's analysis, see supra notes 202-239
and accompanying text.
255. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's analysis concerning environmental, safety, and health hazards, see supra notes 201-211, 227-36 and accompanying
text.
256. See id. (discussing Fourth Circuit's consideration of environmental
factors).
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cluded under the Commerce Clause. 257 Since Fresh Kills in Staten
Island has closed its doors, the issue has a greater certainty of reaching Congressional debate. 2 58 In fact, several bills are pending in
the House of Representatives that would give states authority to regulate solid waste imports. 2 59 Nevertheless, until Congress embraces
this national problem, states face a continual uphill battle to save
their landfill space and protect the health and safety of their
citizens.
Mia Korot
257. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
258. See Patrick Golden, supra note 140, at 10. In light of the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks Fresh kills has reopened temporarily to deal with the massive
disposal of debris as a result of the two fallen towers. Seejim Johnson, Cleaning Up
a Horror:Crews Work to Remove Mountains ofDebris After TerroristAttack, 7 WASTE NEWS
10 (Sept. 17, 2001) availableat 2001 WL 8866742.
259. See Solid Waste: State Officials Urge House Passage of Bill Allowing Restrictions
on Shipments, STATE ENVIRONMENT DAILY, August 3, 2001 (discussing need for con-

gressional action in order for states to have degree of control over type and
amount of waste brought into local communities).
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